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Acore commitment of contemporary nativism is that human beings possessinnate, domain-specific mental structure, not merely for low-level perceptual
processes but also for various ‘‘higher’’ cognitive tasks—paradigmatically, involving
reasoning and decision-making—that would traditionally be viewed as parts of
central cognition. One would be hard pressed to find any nativist who did not
subscribe to this general thesis; and yet the precise nature of the specialized
endowment on which central cognition depends remains a point of considerable
controversy.
According to one venerable proposal that continues to exert a profound in-
fluence on psychological theorizing, the specialized structures on which central
cognition depends primarily take the form of representational items, such as beliefs
and bodies of mentally represented information somewhat akin to theories (Carey,
1985; Fodor, 2000; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1998). This kind of nativism figures
prominently in the rationalist tradition that traces from Plato, through Descartes, to
Chomsky’s work on language; and for this reason I refer to it as psychological
rationalism (or just ‘‘rationalism’’ for short).
In recent years, however, an alternative and more radical nativist proposal has
attained a certain prominence—not to mention notoriety. The view in question is
sometimes called massive modularity (MM) and maintains that, in addition to
whatever innate representational structure we may possess, central processes also
rely on a multitude of innate, special-purpose information processing mechanisms
or ‘‘modules’’ (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Fodor, 2000; Samuels, 1998; Sperber,
1994, 2001). So, for example, it has been suggested that we possess modules for folk
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biology, naive physics, theory of mind, and arithmetic. Thus construed, massive
modularity differs from its more traditional, rationalist counterpart in being pri-
marily a nativism about cognitive mechanisms as opposed to cognitive contents
(Fodor, 2000; Samuels, 1998).
The commitments of MM and psychological rationalism overlap to a con-
siderable degree. Both acknowledge that central cognition depends on substantial
amounts of innate, domain-specific structure. Moreover, contemporary advo-
cates of both positions almost invariably adopt some version of the peripheral
modularity hypothesis, on which both perceptual (or input) processes and motor
(or output) processes are subserved by an array of innate modules (Fodor, 1983).
In view of this, it is seldom easy to discriminate between the two views on ex-
perimental grounds alone. Even so, advocates of MM maintain that their con-
ception of cognition is independently plausible in the light of various general,
theoretical considerations, of which perhaps the most prominent and widely
invoked is what we might call the tractability argument for massive modularity.
According to this argument, central cognition must be subserved by modular
mechanisms because the alternatives—including psychological rationalism—are
computationally intractable.
The central aim of this chapter is to assess the scope and limits of the trac-
tability argument. In doing so, I argue for two claims. First, I argue that when
explored with appropriate care and attention, it becomes clear that the argument
provides no good reason to prefer massive modularity to the more traditional
rationalist alternative. Second, while I deny that tractability considerations support
massive modularity per se, I do not claim that they show nothing whatsoever. In
particular, I argue that a careful analysis of tractability considerations suggest a
range of characteristics that any plausible version of psychological rationalism is
likely to possess.
Before arguing for these claims, however, there are a number of preliminary
issues that need to be addressed. In section 1, I outline and clarify the general form
of the tractability argument; and in section 2 I explain how massive modularity is
supposed to resolve intractability worries. The remainder of the chapter—sections
3 to 7—is largely concerned with highlighting the deficiencies of the main extant
arguments for claiming that nonmodular mechanisms are intractable. In section 8,
I conclude by sketching some of the general characteristics that a plausible ra-
tionalist alternative to massive modularity—one capable of subserving tractable
cognitive processes—is likely to possess.
1 Tractability Arguments for Massive Modularity
Although versions of the tractability argument vary considerably in detail, they all
share the following pair of commitments. First, they assume that the classical
computational theory of mind (CTM) is true:1
1. Though sometimes only tacitly and sometimes only for the sake of argument.
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CTM: Human cognitive processes are classical computational ones—roughly, algorithmically
specifiable processes defined over syntactically structured mental representations.
As has been commonly observed, however, the truth of CTM requires more than
mere computability, since there are many algorithms that demand more time and
resources—memory, information, and computational power—than actual human
beings possess. Rather, what it requires is that mental processes are in some suit-
able sense tractably computable: roughly speaking, that they are specifiable in
terms of algorithms that do not require more time or resources than humans can
reasonably be expected to possess.2 It is on this point that advocates of the trac-
tability argument seek to undermine alternatives to MM. That is, they endorse the
following intractability thesis (IT):
IT: Nonmodular cognitive mechanisms—in particular mechanisms for reasoning—are
computationally intractable.
As will soon become apparent, the arguments for IT vary considerably. Nonetheless,
the source of intractability is almost invariably assumed to be what many have called
the ‘‘frame problem,’’3 though it is perhaps more accurately (and less contentiously)
referred to as the problem of relevance. Nomenclature aside, the problem is this: How
can a device determine in a computationally tractable manner which operations,
options, or items of information are relevant to the cognitive task at hand? A satis-
factory computational theory of mind must address this problem. Yet, according to
IT, non-MM theories are unable to do so because relevance poses an insurmountable
problem for nonmodular reasoning mechanisms. So, it would seem to follow that:
MM: The mind—including those parts responsible for reasoning—is composed of modular
mechanisms.
And this is, of course, precisely what the massive modularity hypothesis requires.
2. According to one characterization of tractability familiar from computer science, an algorithm for
solving some problem is tractable if, in the worst case, it is polynomial in the size of the input; that is, the
resources required to compute a solution to every input can be expressed as a polynomial (or better)
function of input size—e.g., n2 or n300. In contrast, an algorithm is intractable if, in the worst case, it is
superpolynomial, in the sense that resource requirements increase exponentially (or worse) as a function
of input size and can thus only be expressed as superpolynomial functions, such as 2n or 100n. But for
current purposes this characterization of (in)tractability is doubly unsuitable. First, it is very widely
assumed on inductive grounds by those who model cognitive processes that pretty much any interesting
computational problem is superpolynomial in the worst case. Thus, the current criterion for intracta-
bility does little more than characterize those problems that are not of interest to a computational
account of cognition. Second, it is entirely possible for a superpolynomial algorithm to very frequently—
indeed normally—be significantly less expensive than the worst case. In which case, it’s hard to see why
intractability, in this sense, poses a problem for CTM. After all, it may just be that performance
limitations prevent the algorithm being used in the worst case.
3. Dennett (1987); Fodor (1983, 2000); Sperber (1994); Tooby and Cosmides (1992).
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In the following discussion I assume for the sake of argument that CTM is true
and focus on the intractability thesis. What I aim to show is that a commitment to
IT is built on shaky foundations, since the main arguments for it are deeply
unsatisfactory. But first I need to explain how MM is supposed to secure tractability
where the alternatives allegedly fail.
2 How Does Massive Modularity Help Resolve
Tractability Problems?
The answer to the above question can be divided into two parts. First, according to
MM—and in contrast to an earlier, well-known thesis defended by Fodor (1983)
and others—modularity is not restricted to the periphery of the mind: to those input
systems responsible for perception and output systems responsible for the production
of action. According to MM, central systems for reasoning and decision-making can
be divided into modules as well (Jackendoff, 1992). Thus MM maintains that our
minds are modular in precisely those places where relevance is traditionally as-
sumed to pose the greatest threat to tractable computation.
Second, according to the proposal, modules themselves possess certain core
characteristics that engender feasible computation: in particular, domain specificity
and informational encapsulation. The rough idea is that by virtue of possessing either
or both of these,modularmechanisms can avoid the sorts of tractability problems that
(allegedly) plague nonmodular devices. In the remainder of this section I explain this
suggestion in more detail. But first a terminological point: The term ‘‘module’’ is
notoriously ambiguous;4 and it is often unclear how theorists intend it to be under-
stood. But since we are concerned primarily with how modularity helps address
tractability problems, we can safely restrict our attention to those characteristics of
modules that are supposed to resolve such problems: namely, domain specificity and
encapsulation. In what follows, then, I adopt a minimal definition of modules as
computational mechanisms that possess one or both of these characteristics.
2.1 Domain Specificity and Feasible Computation
What is domain specificity and how is it supposed to engender feasible computa-
tion? To a first approximation, amechanism is domain specific if it operates only in a
highly restricted cognitive domain.5 Standard candidates include mechanisms for
face recognition, language, and arithmetic. There are, however, at least two broad
views about cognitive domains that give rise to different conceptions of domain
specificity. According to the first, the domain of a cognitive mechanism is the class of
4. See Segal (1996) and Samuels (2000) for discussions of the various uses of ‘‘module’’ in cognitive
science.
5. It should go without saying—though I’ll say it anyway—that the notion of domain specificity admits of
degree and that researchers who use the notion are interested in whether we possess mechanisms that are
domain specific to some interesting extent. The same points also apply to the notion of informational
encapsulation.
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representations that it can take as input: its input domain. On this conception of
domains, a cognitive mechanism is domain specific to the extent that it can only take
as input a highly restricted range of representations. According to the second con-
ception of cognitive domains, the domain of a mechanism is the task (or function)
that it performs: its task domain. On this conception of domains, a mechanism is
domain specific if it is dedicated to performing a highly restricted task.
Why suppose that domain specificity in either of these senses engenders feasible
computation? The claim cannot be that domain specificity is sufficient for tracta-
bility, since many of the paradigms of intractable computation—such as algorithms
for solving the traveling salesman problem—are very domain specific indeed.6
Nevertheless, if a mechanism is sufficiently domain specific, then it becomes pos-
sible to utilize a potent design strategy for reducing computational load, namely, to
build into the mechanism substantial amounts of information about the domain in
which it operates. This might be done in a variety of ways. It might be only implicit
in the organization of the mechanism, or it might be explicitly represented; it might
take the form of rules or procedures or bodies of propositional knowledge and so on.
But however this information gets encoded, the key point is that a domain-specific
mechanism can be informationally rich and, as a result, capable of rapidly and
efficiently deploying those strategies and options most relevant to the domain in
which it operates. Such mechanisms thereby avoid the need for computationally
expensive search and assessment procedures that might plague a more general-
purpose device. For this reason, domain specificity has seemed to many a plausible
candidate for reducing the threat of combinatorial explosion without compromising
the reliability of cognitive mechanisms (Sperber, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
2.2 Informational Encapsulation and
Feasible Computation
I turn now to the notion of informational encapsulation. According to the standard
definition, an encapsulated cognitivemechanism or faculty is one that ‘‘has access, in the
course of its computations, to less than all of the information at the disposal of the or-
ganism whose cognitive faculty it is’’ (Fodor, 1987, p. 25). Paradigmatic examples—such
as mechanisms for length perception or phonological processing—cannot draw upon
the full range of the organism’s beliefs, goals, and intentions. In contrast, a highly
unencapsulated mechanism—paradigmatically for reasoning—would be one that has
access to (virtually) all of our beliefs, goals, and intentions (Fodor, 1983; Stanovich, 1999).
A number of further comments are in order. First, although it is not uncommon
to confound informational encapsulation and domain specificity (in particular with
regard to the specificity of input domains), they are distinct properties. Both concern
6. In brief, the traveling salesman problem is to find the shortest path that a salesman can take between a
network of cities. This is a highly specialized task and, moreover, the inputs to the process—the names
of cities and representations of inter-city distances—are highly restricted as well. Yet it is notoriously
hard to solve in a computationally tractable manner. This suggests that domain specificity is not
plausibly viewed as sufficient for tractability.
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the access that a mechanism has to representations. Yet the kind of access is quite
different. Input-specificity concerns the class of representations that a mechanism
can take as input: that ‘‘trigger’’ it or ‘‘turn it on.’’ In contrast, the informational
encapsulation of a mechanism concerns the class of representations that it can use as
a resource once it has been so activated. Paradigmatically, encapsulation concerns
the information encoded in memory that the mechanism is able to consult in the
course of providing solutions to the particular inputs that it receives.
Second, encapsulation proper is not just any sort of restriction on access. Rather,
it is supposed to be architecturally imposed. Minimally, this implies the following.
First, encapsulation is a relatively enduring characteristic of the device. Second, it is
not a mere product of performance factors, such as fatigue, lack of time or lapses in
attention. Finally, and most important for my purposes, the encapsulation of a
device is supposed to be cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn, 1984). To a first ap-
proximation: it is not a property of the mechanism that can be changed as a result of
alterations in the beliefs, goals, and other representational states of the organism. Or
roughly equivalently: it is not a property of the mechanism that can be changed by
psychological processes alone.
Third, although there are various ways encapsulation might be architecturally
imposed, the standard suggestion is that encapsulated mechanisms have access to only
the information contained within a restricted, proprietary database. One important
implication is that such mechanisms are unable to deploy information located else-
where in the system even when that information is relevant to the task at hand. Suppose,
for example, that mechanisms for face recognition only have access to a database
of previously encountered faces. Such a device would be unable to utilize other sorts of
information—for example, geographic or autobiographical information—even though
it might sometimes be highly relevant to the task of recognizing faces
Finally, it is worth noting an ambiguity in the standard definition of encap-
sulation between a synchronic and a diachronic reading:
A mechanism M is synchronically encapsulated if, at any time, there is at least some (kind
of ) information possessed by the organism that is inaccessible to M.
AmechanismM is diachronically encapsulated if there is some (kind of ) information that is
inaccessible toM, not merely at some particular time but over a long period—paradigmatically
the entire history of the mechanism.
I assume for two reasons that it is the diachronic notion that should concern
us here. First, the paradigmatic examples of encapsulated modules are clearly
diachronically encapsulated. So, for example, the perceptual mechanisms impli-
cated in the production of persistent illusions—such as the Muller-Lyer or phi
phenomenon—are not merely synchronically encapsulated with respect to our
beliefs about the illusory phenomena.7 (It is not as if, for example, two years hence
7. In the case of the Muller-Lyer illusion, the mechanisms responsible for visual length perception do
not have access the belief that, contrary to appearances, the lines are of identical length.
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they might access the relevant beliefs and the illusions dissipate.) Rather, the claim
is that such beliefs are never accessible to the mechanism. Second, the synchronic
notion is too liberal and classifies as encapsulated mechanisms that would not
normally be counted as such. So, for example, it will count as encapsulated (1) any
deterministic computational device that does not engage in exhaustive memory
search,8 and (2) any reasoning mechanism whose access to information is mediated
via a limited working memory.9 But not all such systems would ordinarily be
construed as encapsulated.
How, then, is encapsulation supposed to facilitate feasible computation? As
with domain specificity, encapsulation is not sufficient for feasibility; and again the
traveling salesman illustrates the point. Algorithms designed to solve this task typi-
cally have access to only the information contained in the input to the process; yet
they are computationally very expensive indeed. Even so, there are two plausible
explanations of how encapsulation might engender tractability: a superficial and a
deeper one.
According to the superficial explanation, encapsulation reduces computa-
tional load in two ways. First, because the device only has access to a highly
restricted database or memory, the costs incurred by memory search are consid-
erably reduced. (There just isn’t that much stuff over which the search can be
performed.) Second, by reducing the range of accessible items of information,
there is a concomitant reduction in the number of relations between items—
paradigmatically, relations of confirmation and relevance—that can be computed.
Yet one might reasonably wonder what all the fuss is about. After all, computer
scientists have generated a huge array of methods—literally hundreds of different
search and approximation techniques—for reducing computational overheads
(Russell & Norvig, 2003). What makes encapsulation of particular interest? Here’s
where the deeper explanation comes into play. Most of the methods that have been
developed for reducing computational load require that the implementing mech-
anisms treat the assessment of relevance as a computational problem. Roughly: they
need to implement computational procedures that select from the available infor-
mation some subset that is estimated to be relevant. In contrast, encapsulation is
supposed to obviate the need for such computational solutions. According to this
view, an encapsulated device (at least paradigmatically) only has access to a very
small amount of information. As a consequence, it can perform (near) exhaustive
search on whatever information it can access, and thereby avoid the need to assess
8. Consider, for example, a domain-general reasoning device with sole access to a general encyclopedic
memory system that contains all the information possessed by the organism of which it is a part. Such a
reasoning mechanism would ordinarily be construed as a paradigm of nonmodularity. But if it were
deterministic and also deployed procedures (e.g., heuristics) for delimiting which portion of the data-
base to access, then it would, on the synchronic reading, count as encapsulated.
9. Consider a mechanism that can access any part of encyclopedic memory but does so via a working
memory of the Miller ‘‘magic number seven’’ variety. Since at any specific time it would only have
access to seven items of information (give or take a bit), it would, on the synchronic reading, be highly
encapsulated.
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relevance. There is a sense, then, in which highly encapsulated devices avoid
the relevance problem altogether (Fodor, 2000).
Assume that the above is correct—that domain specificity and informational
encapsulation help engender feasible computation—then it should be clear how
MM is supposed to address the threat that intractability poses for CTM. What it
does is ensure that reasoning mechanisms are architecturally constrained with
respect to what options and items of information they can consider. Yet it is one
thing to claim that modularity is an important way to engender tractability and
quite another to claim that it is the only plausible way. The former is compatible
with a broad range of architectural hypotheses—including a psychological ratio-
nalism that posits radically nonmodular reasoning mechanisms—while the latter
demands that computationalists adopt an extreme form of MM. In the following
sections, I consider arguments that purport to establish this stronger claim—the
intractability thesis—and show that they are unsatisfactory.
3 Informational Impoverishment
Perhaps the most prominent argument for IT is one made popular by the evolu-
tionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).
The argument proceeds from the assumption that a nonmodular, hence domain-
general, mechanism ‘‘lacks any content, either in the form of domain-specific
knowledge or domain-specific procedures that can guide it towards the solution of
problems’’ (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 94). As a consequence, it ‘‘must evaluate
all the alternatives it can define’’ (p. 94). But as Cosmides and Tooby observe, such
a strategy is subject to serious intractability problems, since even routine cognitive
tasks are such that the space of alternative options tends to increase exponentially.
Nonmodular mechanisms would thus seem to be computationally intractable: at
best intolerably slow and at worst incapable of solving the vast majority of problems
they confront.
Though frequently presented as an objection to non-MM accounts of cogni-
tive architecture, this argument is really only a criticism of theories that characterize
cognitive mechanisms as suffering from a particularly extreme form of informational
impoverishment. Any appearance to the contrary derives from the stipulation that
domain-general mechanisms possess no specialized knowledge. But this conflates
claims about the need for informationally rich cognitive mechanisms—a claim
that I do not wish to deny—with claims about the need for modularity; and al-
though modularity is one way to build specialized knowledge into a system, it
is not the only way. Another is for nonmodular devices to have access to bodies
of specialized knowledge. Indeed, it is commonly assumed by nonmodular—
especially rationalist—accounts of central possessing that such devices have access
to huge amounts of information. This is pretty obvious from even the most cursory
survey of the relevant literatures. Fodor (1983), for example, maintains explicitly that
nonmodular central systems have access to huge amounts of information; as do
Gopnik, Newell, and many others who adopt a nonmodular conception of central
systems (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Newell, 1990). The argument currently under
discussion thus succeeds only in refuting a straw man.
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4 Optimality
Another argument for IT turns on the claim that nonmodular reasoning mecha-
nisms implement optimization processes. In this context, ‘‘optimization’’ refers to
reasoning that broadly conforms to standards of ideal rationality, such as those
characterized by Bayesian accounts of probabilistic inference or standard ap-
proaches to decision theory. There are a range of results that show such reasoning
processes are computationally very expensive indeed (Osherson, 1995);10 and for
this reason they are commonly termed unbounded or even demonic conceptions of
reasoning (Gigerenzer, 2001; Simon, 1972). So if advocates of nonmodular rea-
soning mechanisms are committed to optimization, then the view they endorse
would be subject to serious intractability worries as well.
It is not at all clear to me that anyone explicitly endorses the above argument,
though it is strongly suggested by some recent discussions of nonmodular rea-
soning architectures (Dietrich & Fields, 1996; Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer et al.,
1999). The argument is not, however, a good one. Though optimal reasoning is
(at least in the general case) intractable,11 nonmodularists are in no way committed
to such a view of human reasoning. What is true is that for a mechanism to
optimize it needs to be unencapsulated, hence nonmodular; and this is because,
as ordinarily construed, optimization demands the updating of all one’s beliefs in
the light of new information. But the converse is not true: an unencapsulated
mechanism need not be an optimizer. On the contrary, since the inception of
artificial intelligence (AI) it has been commonplace to combine a nonmodular
conception of reasoning with the explicit denial of optimization. Consider, for
example, Newell and Simon’s seminal work on the general problem solver (GPS).
As the name suggests, GPS was designed to apply across a very wide range of
content domains without architectural constraint on what representations is could
use. It is thus not plausibly viewed as modular. But, to use Simon’s famous
expression, it was designed to satisfice—to arrive at solutions that were good
enough—not to optimize. Much the same could be said for many of the non-
modular, accounts of reasoning to be found in classical AI and cognitive science,
including Laird and Newell’s SOAR architecture (Newell, 1990). These are
among the paradigm nonmodular approaches to cognition, yet they are in no way
committed to optimization.
10. To use one well-known example, on standard Bayesian accounts, the equations for assessing the
impact of new evidence on our current beliefs are such that if one’s system of beliefs has n elements,
then computing the new probability of a single belief, B, will require 2n additions (Harman, 1986). Such
methods thus involve an exponential growth in number of computations as a function of belief system
size. To give some idea of just how expensive this is, on the hyperconservative assumption that we
possess 100 beliefs, calculating the probability assignment of a belief B on the basis of new information
will require the performance of more than 1030 additions, which is considerably more than the number
of microseconds that have elapsed since the Big Bang!
11. Though there is lots of good research that aims to discover tractable methods for applying ideal
standards of rationality to interesting—but restricted—domains. See, for example, the literature on
Bayesian networks (Pearle, 1988).
The Complexity of Cognition 115
5 Exhaustive Search
Still, even if optimization as such is not a problem for nonmodular accounts of
reasoning, it might still be that there are properties of optimal reasoning to which
the nonmodularist is committed and that these properties are sufficient to generate
intractability problems. Exhaustive search is perhaps the most plausible candidate
for this role. The rough idea is that nonmodular reasoning mechanisms must
perform exhaustive searches over our beliefs. But, given even a conservative esti-
mate of the size of any individual’s belief system, such a search would be unfea-
sible in practice. In which case, it would seem that nonmodular reasoning
mechanisms are computationally intractable.
Again, it’s not at all clear to me that anyone really endorses this argument,
though some have found it hard not to view advocates of nonmodular central
systems as somehow committed to exhaustive search (Carruthers, 2004; Glymour,
1985). Yet this view is incorrect. What the nonmodularist does accept is
that unencapsulated reasoning mechanisms have access to huge amounts of
information—paradigmatically, all the agent’s background beliefs. But the relevant
notion of access is a modal one. It concerns what information—given architectural
constraints—a mechanism can mobilize in solving a problem. In particular, it
implies that any background belief can be used, not that the mechanism in fact
mobilizes the entire set of background beliefs—that is, that it engage in exhaustive
search. And this is just as well, since it would be absurd to hold a nonmodular view of
reasoning if it implied exhaustive search (Fodor, 1985).
Of course, the fact that the nonmodularist does not endorse the claim that central
systems engage in exhaustive search is perfectly consistent with there being an argument
that shows such processes would need to occur if a nonmodular account of reasoning
were true. In the next section, I consider a recent argument from Fodor (2000) that has
been widely interpreted by advocates of MM as supporting this conclusion.
6 The Locality Argument
Fodor’s argument is a complex one, but the core idea can be framed in terms of a
tension between two claims. Thefirst is that classical computational processes are local
in roughly the following sense: what computations apply to a particular representation
is determined solely by its constituent structure—that is, by how the representation is
constructed from its parts (Fodor, 2000, p. 30). To take a very simple example, whether
the addition function can be applied to a given representation is solely determined by
whether or not it has the appropriate syntactic structure—for example, whether it
contains a permissible set of symbols related by ‘‘þ.’’
The second claim is that much of our reasoning is global, in that it is sensitive to
context-dependent properties of the entire belief system. In arguing for this, Fodor
focuses primarily on abductive reasoning (or inference to the best explanation).12
12. Though he thinks that the same considerations apply to decision-making or planning as well.
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Such inferences routinely occur in science and, roughly speaking, consist in coming
to endorse a particular belief or hypothesis on the grounds that it constitutes the best
available explanation of the data. One familiar feature of such inferences is that
the relative quality of hypotheses are not assessed merely in terms of their ability to
fit the data but also in terms of their simplicity and conservativism.13 According to
Fodor, however, these properties are not intrinsic to a belief or hypothesis but are
global characteristics that a belief or hypothesis possesses by virtue of its relationship
to a constantly changing system of background beliefs. The problem, then, is this:
If classical computational operations are local, how could global reasoning pro-
cesses, such as abduction, be computationally tractable?
Notice that if the above is correct, then a classical abductive process could not
operate merely by looking at the hypotheses to be evaluated. This is because, by
assumption, what classical computations apply to a representation is determined
solely by its constituent structure, whereas the simplicity and conservativism of a
hypothesis, H, depend not only on its constituent structure but its relations to our
system of background beliefs, K. In which case, a classical implementation of
abduction would need to look at both H and whatever parts of K determine the
simplicity and conservativism of H. The question is: How much of K needs to be
consulted in order for a classical system to perform reliable abduction? According
to Fodor, the answer is that lots—indeed, very often, the totality—of the back-
ground will need to be accessed, since this is the ‘‘only guaranteed way’’ of clas-
sically computing a global property. But this threatens to render reliable abduction
computationally intractable. As Fodor puts its:
Reliable abduction may require, in the limit, that the whole background of epi-
stemic commitments be somehow brought to bear on planning and belief fixation.
But feasible abduction requires in practice that not more than a small subset of
even the relevant background beliefs are actually consulted. (2000, p. 37)
In short: if classicism is true, abduction cannot be reliable. But since abduction
presumably is reliable, classicism is false.
If sound, the above argument would appear to show that classicism itself is
untenable. So, why would anyone think it supports MM? The suggestion appears
to be that MM provides the advocate of CTM with a way out: a way of avoiding the
tractability problems associated with the globality of abduction without jettisoning
CTM (Sperber, chapter 4 here; Carruthers, chapter 5 here). Fodor himself put the
point as well as anyone:
Modules are informationally encapsulated by definition. And, likewise by defini-
tion, the more encapsulated the informational resources to which a computational
mechanism has access, the less the character of its operations is sensitive to global
properties of belief systems. Thus to the extent that the information accessible to a
device is architecturally constrained to a proprietary database, it won’t have a frame
13. Very roughly: (1) one hypothesis is simpler (or more parsimonious) than another if it posits fewer
entities/causes/parameters, and (2) one hypothesis is more conservative than another if it requires less
revision to our belief system.
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problem and it won’t have a relevance problem (assuming that these are different);
not, at least, if the database is small enough to permit approximations to exhaustive
searches. (2000, p. 64)
The modularity of central systems is thus supposed to render reasoning processes
sufficiently local to permit tractable computation.
There are a number of serious problems with the above line of argument. One
that I will not address here concerns the extent to which MM provides a satis-
factory way of shielding CTM from the tractability worries associated with glob-
ality.14 What I will argue, however, is that although simplicity and conservativism
are plausibly context dependent, Fodor provides us with no reason whatsoever to
think that they are global in any sense that threatens nonmodular versions of CTM.
First, when assessing the claim that abduction is global, it is important to
keep firmly in mind the general distinction between normative and descriptive-
psychological claims about reasoning: claims about how we ought to reason and
claims about how we actually reason. This distinction applies to the specific case of
assessing the simplicity and conservativism of hypotheses. On the normative read-
ing, assessments of simplicity and conservativism ought to be global: that is, nor-
matively correct assessments ought to take into consideration one’s total background
epistemic commitments. But of course it is not enough for Fodor’s purposes that
such assessments ought to be global. Rather, it needs to be the case that the as-
sessments humans make are, in fact, global; and to my knowledge, there is no reason
whatsoever to suppose that this is true.
A comparison with the notion of consistency may help to make the point clearer.
Consistency is frequently construed as a normative standard against which to assess
one’s beliefs (Dennett, 1987). Roughly: all else being equal, one’s beliefs ought to be
consistent with each other. When construed in this manner, however, it is natural to
think that consistency should be a global property in the sense that any belief ought
to be consistent with the entirety of one’s background beliefs. But there is absolutely no
reason to suppose—and indeed some reason to deny—that human beings conform to
this norm (Cherniak, 1986). Moreover, this is so in spite of the fact that consistency
really does play a role in our inferential practices. What I am suggesting is that much
the same may be true of simplicity and conservativism. When construed in a nor-
mativemanner, it is natural15 to think of them as global properties, but when construed
as properties of the beliefs that figure in actual human inference, there is no reason to
suppose that they accord with this normative characterization.
Second, even if we suppose that the simplicity and conservativism are global
properties of actual beliefs, the locality argument still does not go through, since it
turns on the implausible assumption that we are guaranteed to make successful as-
sessments of simplicity and conservativism. Specifically, in arguing for the conclusion
that abduction is computationally unfeasible, Fodor relies on the claim that ‘‘the only
guaranteed way of Classically computing a syntactic-but-global property’’ is to take
14. Though see Samuels (forthcoming) for an extended discussion of this issue.
15. Though by no means mandatory.
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‘‘whole theories as computational domains’’ (2000, p. 36). But guarantees are beside the
point. Why suppose that we always successfully compute the global properties on
which abduction depends? Presumably we do not. And one very plausible suggestion is
that we fail to do so when the cognitive demands required are just too great. In
particular, for all that is known, we may well fail under precisely those circumstances
that the classical viewwould predict—namely, when toomuch of a belief systemneeds
to be consulted in order to compute the simplicity or conservativism of a given belief.
7 The Robot Argument
The final argument for IT that I will discuss consists in an induction from recent trends
in AI and robotics (Carruthers, 2004; Goodie et al., 1999). The starting point for this
argument is that if one wants to assess the computational feasibility of classical, non-
MM architectures, then the repeated efforts of computer scientists to produce feasible
intelligent systems—paradigmatically, robots—constitute an important source of evi-
dence. According to the robot argument, however, research in the past decade or so has
increasingly converged on one form or other of massive modularity. To mention just
two examples, behavior-based approaches have had an enormous influence on robotics
(Brooks, 1999) while so-called multiagent systems has been among the most rapidly
developing areas of AI in recent years (Ferber). Moreover, so the argument continues,
this convergence is largely a consequence of the problems that researchers encounter
in trying to develop practically feasible real-time systems. Roughly: nonmodular sys-
tems have in practice turned out to be unfeasible, whereasmodular ones have been far
less prone to such problems. It would seem, then, that the pattern of successes and
failures in AI and robotics provide us with good—albeit nondemonstrative—grounds
for accepting MM (Carruthers, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2001, p. 43).
The general form of the argument is a perfectly respectable one. Indeed, if
CTM is true, then careful and accurate analysis of contemporary AI and robotics
might have much to tell us about the architecture of human cognition. My concern,
however, is that the analysis on which the robot argument depends is neither careful
nor accurate. What is true is that research—especially in robotics—has converged
on the need for a kind of module that Rodney Brooks calls reactive behaviors. Such
modules are a commonplace feature of contemporary robots and are designed to
generate rapid, real-time responses—such as avoidance behavior—to prespecified
sets of environmental conditions (Brooks, 1999; Bryson, 2000). Moreover, the pop-
ularity of these kinds of modules is, in large measure, a response to the dramatic
failure of a less modular approach to robotics—the sense-model-plan-act paradigm—
which assumed that virtually all robot behavior should be mediated by the activity of
a general-purpose planning system (Bonasso et al., 1998; Brooks, 1999).16
But this alone does not constitute an argument for massivemodularity. What the
Robot Argument needs to show is that there has been convergence on the idea that
16. The most famous product of the SMPA paradigm was Shakey, the Stanford Research Institute robot
(Nilsson, 1984).
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central systems are modular; and no such convergence of opinion exists within the AI
community. Even in robotics where tractable, real-time performance is of a premium,
the dominant kind of computational architectures—so-called three-layered or hybrid
systems—incorporate a deliberative layer of nonmodular mechanisms for planning
and world-modeling quite similar to those that figured in the discredited sense-model-
plan-act paradigm (Bonasso et al., 1998; Gat, 1998).17 In contrast to earlier proposals,
however, the hybrid approach incorporates two additional design principles. First, the
systemhas a reactive layer that contains amultitude of Brookianmodules that enable it
to respond rapidly to environmental contingencies. Second, in large measure because
of this, the reasoning mechanisms within the deliberative layer of the system can
be ‘‘decoupled’’ from real-time activities—such as obstacle avoidance—and instead
deployed to generate solutions to complex, informationally intensive, decision-
making tasks. The result of combining these various features is a kind of system that is
bothmore flexible than those composed solely of reactive behaviors andmore capable
of real-time performance than those that assign a larger role to reasoning mechanisms
(Russell & Norvig, 2003).
8 Conclusion
The main burden of this chapter has been to argue that we currently possess no
good reason to accept IT, hence no reason to endorse MM on the grounds of
tractability. Thus formulated, the project is a largely negative one. But my dis-
cussion of the arguments for IT also yield a series of positive suggestions about the
general properties that the kind of computational architecture proposed by psy-
chological rationalists is likely to possess. None of these suggestions are, I think,
particularly surprising; and many of them are utterly commonplace in those re-
gions of cognitive science most concerned with the computational implementation
of cognitive processes. In view of the confusions that surround debate over
MM, however, it is perhaps worth concluding this chapter by assembling these
claims.
1. Informational richness (sec. 3). In view of the sorts of problems that
Cosmides and Tooby pose for informationally impoverished cognitive
mechanisms, it seems highly likely that nonmodular reasoning systems will
almost invariably possess specialized bodies of knowledge about the do-
mains in which they operate. Indeed, on a rationalist construal of such
systems, they are likely to possess lots of innate, domain-specific information.
2. Suboptimality (sec. 4). There are overwhelming reasons to think that
‘‘optimal’’ reasoning processes of the kind associated with ideal theories
of rationality are computationally intractable. In view of this, the
reasoning processes subserved by nonmodular central systems will be
suboptimal or bounded.
17. Another prominent example of a nonmodular reasoning system in AI is the procedural reasoning
system (PRS; Georgeff & Lansky, 1987; d’Inverno et al., 1997).
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3. Limited search (sec. 5). Nonmodular central systems will also not en-
gage in exhaustive search of the information available to them, since,
given a reasonable estimate of the size of a human belief system, it
would pose serious tractability problems.
4. Limited sensitivity to the global properties of cognition (sec. 6). Fodor is
right to claim that a computational, reasoning mechanism would be
intractable if it were both highly reliable and sensitive to global prop-
erties of the belief system. But as I argued in section 6, this does not imply
there are no nonmodular, computational mechanisms for reasoning. All
that follows is that our reasoning is not all that sensitive to global prop-
erties after all; and this is, I maintain, an entirely sensible position for the
advocate of nonmodular reasoning mechanisms to adopt.
5. Autonomy from real-time control of action.(sec 7). If we are to take se-
riously the last two decades of research in robotics, it would seem that
incorporating nonmodular reasoning mechanisms into a cognitive sys-
tem while avoiding practical tractability problems requires that the
operations of such devices are decoupled from fine-grained, real-time
behavioral operations. Instead, nonmodular reasoning mechanisms are
likely to operate at amore coarse-grained temporal scale in order tomake
crucial decisions, construct relatively long-term plans, and provide rich
representations of the world that can aid in the pursuit of the agents
epistemic and practical goals.
6. The need for reactive behaviors (sec. 7). Since human beings do succeed
in responding in real time to environmental conditions, claim 5 implies
that nonmodular reasoning mechanisms need to be located within an
architecture that contains other mechanisms that are responsible for the
production of fine-grained, real-time responses. This claim is not at all
contentious among nativists, since, as mentioned earlier, they almost
invariably assume that humans possess a variety of input systems and
output systems that play this role. Nonetheless, I would suggest that the
past few decades of research in robotics makes it plausible to posit an
additional kind of mechanism that aids in the production of real-time
behavior: modular ‘‘reactive behaviors’’ that produce rapid behavioral
responses to stereotypic environmental conditions.
Where do these comments leave us? What I think they provide is a rough
sketch of some characteristics that a cognitive architecture of the kind advocated by
psychological rationalists would be likely to possess. Is there any reason to suppose
that this rationalist view is preferable to a thoroughgoing MM that denies the
existence of nonmodular reasoning mechanisms? Clearly, I have provided no ar-
gument for such a conclusion in the foregoing discussion. For what its worth,
however, I suspect that a non-MM account of cognition is likely to do far better at
explaining the peculiar flexibility of human behavior and cognition. But an ex-
planation of why this is so will have to wait for another day.
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